Twin Shadows: Moral Strategies of the Kinga of Southwest Tanzania | Ethnography | Bisexuality
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Welcome to frank bellamy - the checklist Interestingly, Bellamy illustrated few book titles. London: Lutterworth Press, The safe door's swinging wide! Your back tyre is terribly flat. London: Eyre Methuen, p. Boy's Own Companion [No. Frank Bellamy's King Arthur and his knights: the complete adventures - see reprint list of Swift Vol. I, Virgil. David Wishart. Richard Blake. Death in Byzantium - Box Set.
The Confessions of X. Suzanne M. Douglass Parker.
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The Graveyard of the Hesperides. Daisy Dunn. The Satyricon: the Apocolocyntosis. Imperial Purple. Edgar Saltus. The Satyricon. A World of Difference. Edmund Cooper. Treatises on Friendship and Old Age. The Death of the Gods. Dmitry Merezhkovsky. The Sixteen Satires. The Poems.
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Iron and Rust: free sampler Throne of the Caesars, Book 1. Jerry Toner. Selected Letters. The Satires of Horace and Persius. The Last Confession. Morris West. Charles Earle Funk. The Annals of Ancient Rome. Paul Doherty. The Oxford Anthology of Roman Literature. Peter E. Never His Sword. Terry Hayman. When in Rome. Paul Chrystal. The Roman Way. Edith Hamilton. Murder at the Oracle of Didyma. Michael B. The Gladiator. Alan Baker. Once Upon a Time, on Lesbos. Alex G. Opening Pandora's Box. Ferdie Addis. Cavafy: Poems. Consantine P. Plutarchs Lives: Life of Demosthenes.
David Stuttard. Death By Roses.
Vulnavia Vox. But there are mouse traps designed with adhesives, boxes, poisons, and so on. Contrast mouse traps with diamonds. Diamonds are valued for their hardness, their optical properties, and their rarity in nature. But not every hard, transparent, white, rare crystal is a diamond—the most infamous alternative being cubic zirconia.
Diamonds are carbon crystals with specific molecular lattice structures. Being a diamond is a matter of being a certain kind of physical stuff. That cubic zirconia is not quite as clear or hard as diamonds explains something about why it is not equally valued. But even if it were equally hard and equally clear, a CZ crystal would not thereby be a diamond. These examples can be used to explain the core idea of functionalism. Functionalism is the theory that mental states are more like mouse traps than they are like diamonds. That is, what makes something a mental state is more a matter of what it does, not what it is made of.
It also distinguishes functionalism from contemporary monisms such as J. The identity theory says that mental states are particular kinds of biological states—namely, states of brains—and so presumably have to be made of certain kinds of stuff, namely, brain stuff.
Mental states, according to the identity theory, are more like diamonds than like mouse traps. Functionalism is also distinguished from B. According to behaviorism, which mental states a creature has depends just on how it behaves or is disposed to behave in response to stimuli. So functionalists think that it is what the internal states do that makes them mental states, not just what is done by the creature of which they are parts. As it has thus far been explained, functionalism is a theory about the nature of mental states. As such, it is an ontological or metaphysical theory.
And this is how it will be discussed, below. But it is also worthwhile to note that functionalism comes in other varieties as well. Functionalism could be a philosophical theory about psychological explanations that psychological states are explained as functional states or about psychological theories that psychological theories take the form of functional theories.
Finally, functionalism may be viewed as a methodological account of psychology, the theory that psychology should be pursued by studying how psychological systems operate. For detailed discussion of these variations, see Polger, , ch. Often philosophers and cognitive scientists have subscribed to more than one of these versions of functionalism together.
Sometimes it is thought that some require others, or at least that some entail others when combined with certain background assumptions. If so, intentional functionalism may entail metaphysical functionalism. All this being said, metaphysical functionalism is the central doctrine and probably the most widely endorsed. So in what follows the metaphysical variety will be the focus. Before looking at the arguments for and against functionalism, it is necessary to clarify the idea that, for mental states, being is doing. Plausibly a physical stuff kind such as diamond has a physical or structural essence, i.
It happens that diamonds can cut glass, but so can many other things that are not diamonds. But it is also plausible that not all stuffs are made up in this way. Some things may be essentially constituted by their relations to other things, and by what they can do. The most obvious examples are artifacts like mousetraps and keys. Being a key is not a matter of being a physical thing with a certain composition, but it is a matter of being a thing that can be used to perform a certain action, namely, opening a lock.
Lock is likewise not a physical stuff kind, but a kind that exists only in relation to among other things keys. There may be metal keys, wood keys, plastic keys, digital keys, or key-words. What makes something a key is not its material composition or lack thereof, but rather what it does, or could do, or is supposed to do.
Making sense of the claim that there is something that some kinds of things are supposed to do is one of the important challenges for functionalists. The activities that a key does, could do, or is supposed to do may be called its functions. So one can say that keys are essentially things that have certain functions, i. Or the kind key is a functional kind. The functionalist idea is, in some forms, quite ancient.
One can find in Aristotle the idea that things have their functions or purposes—their telos — essentially. In contemporary theories applied to the mind, the functions in question are usually taken to be those that mediate between stimulus and psychological inputs and behavioral and psychological outputs. Modern computers demonstrate that quite complex processes can be implemented in finite devices working by basic mechanical principles.
If minds are functional devices of this sort, then one can begin to understand how physical human bodies can produce the tremendous variety of actions and reactions that are associated with our full, rich mental lives. The best theory, Putnam hypothesized, is that mental states are functional states—that the kind mind is a functional kind.
The initial inspiration for functionalism comes from the useful analogy of minds with computing machines, as noted above. Putnam was certainly not the first to notice that this comparison could be theoretically fruitful. Many arguments for functionalism depend on the actuality or possibility of systems that have mental states but that are either physically or behaviorally distinct from human beings.
These arguments are mainly negative arguments that aim to show that the alternatives to functionalism are unacceptable. For example, behaviorists famously held that psychological states are not internal states at all, whether physical or psychical. But, the argument goes, it is easy to imagine two creatures that are behaviorally indistinguishable and that differ in their mental states. The most famous arguments for functionalism are responses not to behaviorism but to the mind-brain identity theory. If mental state kinds are identical to kinds of brain states, then there is a one-to-one relation between mental state kinds and brain state kinds.
Everything that has sensation S must have brain state B, and everything that has brain state B must have sensation S. Not only that, but this one-to-one correlation must not be accidental. It must be a law of nature, at least, and perhaps must hold with an even stronger sort of necessity.
Put this way, the mind-brain identity theory seems to make a very strong claim, indeed.
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As Hilary Putnam notes,. At the same time, it must not be a possible physically possible state of the brain of any physically possible creature that cannot feel pain. Even if such a state can be found, it must be nomologically certain that it will also be a state of the brain of any extraterrestrial life that may be found that will be capable of feeling pain before we can even entertain the supposition that it may be pain.
Putnam The obvious implication is that the mind-brain identity theory is false. Other mammals, reptiles, and mollusks can experience pain, but they do not have brains like ours. It seems to follow that there is not a one-to-one relation between sensations and brain processes, but rather a one-to-many relation. Mental states, then, are not uniquely realized as the identity theory requires ; they are instead multiply realized. And even if by chance it turns out that mammals, reptiles, and mollusks all have similar brains so that in fact there is a one-to-one correlation , certainly one can recognize the possibility that it might be discovered that terrestrial or extraterrestrial creatures who experience pains but do not have brains like those of human beings.
So it is surely not necessary that there is a one-to-one relation between mental state kinds and brain states kinds, but that is exactly what the identity theory would require. This is bad news for the identity theory, but it is good news for functionalism. For functionalism says that what makes something a mental state is what it does, and it is fully compatible with the diverse brains of mammals, reptiles, and mollusks that they all have mental states because their different brains do the same things, that is, they function in the same ways.
Functionalism is supported because it is a theory of mind that is compatible with the likely degree of multiple realization of mental states. Another pair of arguments for functionalism are what can be called the Optimistic and Pessimistic Arguments. The optimistic argument leans on the possibility of building artificial minds. The Optimistic Argument holds that even if no one ever discovers a creature that has mental states but differs from humans in its brain states, surely one could build such a thing.
That is, the possibility of artificial intelligence seems to require the truth of something like functionalism. Functionalism views the mind very much as an engineer does: minds are mechanisms, and there is usually more than one way to build a mechanism. The Optimistic Argument, then, is a variation on the multiple realization argument discussed above; but this version does not depend on empirical facts about how our world is in fact, as the multiple realization argument does.
The Pessimistic Argument claims that the alternatives to functionalism would leave people unable to know about and explain the mental states of one another, or of other creatures. After all, if two creatures function in the same ways, achieve the same results, have isomorphic internal states, etc. The identity theory says that the justification has to do with what kinds of stuff the creatures are made of—only the one with the right kind of brain counts as having mental states.
But this flies in the face of our ordinary practices of understanding, attributing, and explaining mental states. One knows that because the speaker not only produce those noises as the behaviorist might say , but because they have internal states that function in certain ways. One can test this, as psychologists often do, by running experiments in a laboratory or, as ordinary people do, by asking questions and observing replies. That is, we can find out how the systems function.
And if functionalism is correct, that is all we need to know in order to have knowledge of other minds. But if the identity theory is correct, then those methods are at best heuristics, and the observer may yet be wrong. One cannot know for certain that the speaker has pains or beliefs unless one knows what kind of brain the speaker has.
Without knowing about brains, we can only infer that others have beliefs on the basis of the behavioral symptoms they exhibit, and we already know see above, regarding behaviorism and Super-Spartans that those can lead us astray. And that is crazy.
The trouble with the Optimistic Argument is that it is question-begging. It assumes that one can create artificial thinking things without duplicating the kinds of brain states that human beings have, and that is just what the identity theory denies. The trouble with the Pessimistic Argument is that it seems to exploits a very high standard for knowledge of other minds — namely infallibility or certainty.
The objection gets its grip only if the requirement to infer facts about others minds does undermine the possibility of knowledge about those minds.