Rather, the German political economy has given rise to and is at the same time dependent on a kind of management personnel which refutes the idea of management as a unified profession Sorge The following section will analyze if and how these characteristic career features of German managers have changed over time.
Following the two different arguments on the presence and future of the German political economy and against the background of the elite literature two different expectations on the development of the German corporate elite can be formulated. From the stability thesis, as argued by the Varieties of Capitalism literature, only minor changes in the elite structure are expected to occur over the period of observation.
The change thesis, however, as spelled out by the literature on the dissolution of the Germany Inc. These should especially show up from the s onwards. According to both positions, the transformation- thesis as well as of the hybridization-thesis, adoptions of the career patterns known from the Anglo-Saxon context would be expected to become observable. Following the operationalization of other studies, a background in engineering and natural sciences is associated with technical expertise.
With the exception of the s, the shares of managers with a degree in engineering or natural-sciences exceed the shares of managers who studied economics or business administration as well as those with a degree in legal studies.
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There are only two years in which CEOs with a background in economics and business administration have higher shares than CEOs with technical expertise, namely and In those two years of observation clearly more than every second CEO has studied economics or business administration. In the same two years the shares of CEOs with a degree in engineering and natural sciences are the lowest reported over the whole period of observation. At the turn of the century, however, they have regained most of their shares from earlier periods outnumbering the managers with a degree in economics and business administration by more than ten percentage points.
From onwards the leading positions in the German economy are dominated to a higher degree by trained engineers and natural scientists than in the heyday of the German model, that is the s and early s. However, in the sense it is used here, technical expertise refers to the competencies of the managers in the field of production of a company.
The s show a very different pattern than the other years of observation. While between and the share of CEOs with a background in business economics more than doubles from 29 to 60 percent , the share of those who studied engineering and natural sciences is almost halved from 49 to 26 percent. Given the fact that the professional qualifications in this summary are not exclusive categories, trained business economists clearly not only gain in importance but even displace those that studied engineering and natural sciences during this decade. This policy, by necessity, will be bounded by the internal logic of their organizations, what those actors know, how they perceive the world, and what they define as appropriate organizational behavior.
The perspective that managers and entrepreneurs develop can be called conception of control. They can be interpreted as indicating stability just as well as change, depending on which professional qualification one highlights.
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Within the framework of the Varieties of Capitalism approach especially the complementarities of the different institutions are expected to help reinforce the old equilibrium after external shocks. The comeback of trained engineers and natural scientists at the turn of the century after their rapid decline may be seen to prove the inertia of the inner logic of the German political economy. After all technical expertise still seems to play an important role on the way to one of the leading positions in the German economy.
Focussing on the development of the CEOs with a background in business economics, however, seems to provide some support to the change hypothesis. Even though trained business economists appear to be unable to confirm their dominance over the last decade of the 20th century, they do gain influence over the whole course of time. Between and the share of CEOs with a degree in business economics doubles from 21 to 42 percent. Until the s and with the exception of the shares of CEOs who studied law develop fairly similar to those holding a degree in business economics. With shares approximately between twenty and thirty percent they reach their all-time high share in , when every third CEO has a background in legal studies exceeding even the share of trained engineers and natural scientists for this year of observation.
By , however, their influence has faded, with not even every tenth CEO holding a degree in law studies anymore. While the significance of CEOs with a degree in law studies is marginalized after , trained business economists manage to establish their influence next to the engineers and natural scientists. By the end of the period of observation more than every third CEO holds a degree in business economics.
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Without refuting the dominance of the engineering and natural sciences in the professional qualification of German CEOs, business economics is obviously gaining importance in the leading positions of the German economy. Finally, the development of the professional occupations of the German corporate elite does not promote a clear interpretation with regard to the research question posed.
From the data presented no conclusion can be drawn as of whether the dominant conception of control has been changed. At the same time neither is there overwhelming proof for the opposite case.
The abrupt changes in the occupational backgrounds of the corporate elite however suggest that the old logic of the social production regime has at least been challenged in this decade. Whether this is related to the uprising of a new understanding of the company is an open question. But highlighting the establishment of chief financial officers CFOs on the board of US companies from the late s onwards Zorn points out that the decline of finance CEOs need not imply the end of the finance or shareholder value conception of control. In a similar vein Beyer argues that in the German case the group of managers, exercising finance markets oriented practices meanwhile exceeds the financial experts Beyer b: Given the seeming plausibility of the new conception of control ibid it may be argued that the finance CEO may have been necessary for diffusing the new company objectives.
Once in place, however, special finance expertise at the top was no longer needed to keep the firms being run according to the new logic. So while the analysis of the occupational backgrounds suggests the s as a decade of some change without providing a definite answer of its degree or even direction, perhaps other career features shed more light on this issue. According to this companies in Germany tend to appoint internally promoted managers as CEOs, that is managers who have spent most of their career within the same company.
The share of 7 In the dataset that forms the basis of this analysis careers which for at least two thirds take place within the same corporate group the person is later assigned to as CEO are coded as in-house careers.
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With at least sixty percent the shares are even higher between and The lowest shares can be found in the beginning of the period, especially and The share of CEOs with an in-house career indeed drops about 15 percents points between and If this development indicates a lasting trend however can at present not be determined. Figure 2: In-house career share of CEO with an in-house career ,0 90,0 80,0 70,0 share in percent 70,8 60,0 66,7 66,0 62,2 60,0 50,0 58,1 56,3 55,3 50,0 50,0 40,0 30,0 20,0 10,0 0,0 38 42 40 43 42 45 50 48 47 48 year n The enduring relevance of in-house careers for appointing CEOs seems to indicate lasting rather than changing recruitment patterns.
Instead of an emerging market for company leaders one typical feature associated with German managers appears to be strengthened, especially throughout the s and s. What these studies miss, however, is the fact that in-house careers can take place within the same company intra-corporate or within the same company group across the group. Figure 3 shows that in spite of its lasting relevance the structure of the in-house career has changed over time. A decisive shift from narrow to broad in-house careers occurs after the s.
Until then two-thirds to one-fourth of the internally recruited CEOs had been working in the very same company before their appointment. By their share has been reduced to a good third of managers with in-house careers, the great majority being recruited across the group. In comparison to the share of managers with a broad in-house career doubles from 23 to 46 percent.
Yet in contrast to the occupational qualifications this development has not been reversed since the turn of the century. The greater relevance of across the group careers today is related to a change in the corporate structure. The increasing decentralization of firms has facilitated a structural divide in parent and subsidiary companies, limiting the possibilities for narrow in-house careers.
This applies especially to those holding companies in which the parent company is not involved in the production and operating business but rather runs the group by financial target figures.
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Finally, even though the in-house careers appear at first sight as a stable pattern of German CEOs, a closer analysis reveals a clear structural change. With internal recruitment remaining relevant in the German context an external market for managers does not seem to evolve.
This however is not to belittle the structural change from narrow to broad in-house careers. Rather than establishing an external market for managers as by and large associated with the Anglo- Saxon context, a new pattern may evolve within the German context. The increasing appointment of CEOs with a broad in-house career may indicate an evolving internal market for managers, thus combing traditional German recruitment aspects — such as loyalty and achievement — with more competitive elements. Conventionally one of the management board members was elected as CEO, whereas usually only managers in charge of production, development or finance were considered.
Thus taking into account managers across the group as prospective CEOs increases the number of competitors for that position. A sharpened competition for the CEO position is also indicated by the two last characteristics analyzed and discussed in the following section.
Though an external market for managers has not yet been established, recruitment of the CEOs is limited to narrow in-house careers to a much lesser extend today. Not only does this development indicate at least a slight intensification of competition for these positions but it also implies a more broad operating experience on the side of the CEOs. The following chapter analyzes the development of the average age of German managers when appointed CEO and the average length of their tenure.
As with the in-house careers the average age of appointment appears stable at first sight. Again, however, a closer analysis reveals interesting insights. As for the average tenure the results are more clear-cut, suggesting a change in the role and autonomy of the CEO.
German managers are said to be older than their international colleagues when appointed CEO. It is reasoned that this circumstance to some extent reflects their lower levels when entering the company and their longer as well as more concrete hands-on experience in their respective departments. In this respect the higher average age of appointment is seen to be related to the missing understanding as management as a unified profession in the German context.
After all, it is also the longer time frame managers spend in their respective departments which lets them ascend to the top slower.
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The analysis of the average age of appointment shows only a slight alteration see Figure 4. The CEOs of were on average not even three years older than their successors of Figure 4: Average age when appointed CEO 80,0 70 70,0 66 62 63 62 60 60 60 61 58 60,0 53,2 52,6 52,1 52,2 52,4 51,1 51,4 51,1 50,7 49,0 age 50,0 40,0 44 39 39 39 38 35 36 35 30,0 27 27 20,0 38 42 40 43 42 45 50 48 47 47 year n average minimum maximum Taking into account the lowest and highest ages of appointment for each year even seems to suggest a stabilization of the recruitment patterns.
The level of the age difference is much lower after Whereas it ranged from 30 to 36 years between and , during the second half of the observation period it varies between 16 and 23 years. Thus with respect to the age of appointment the period after the s seems to indicate not only stability but even stabilization. It is plausible to assume that the small share of this cohort related its high share of losses in the Second World War, since this cohort was aged between 16 and 27 during and That is to say it does not capture the age at which a manager reaches his9 first CEO position.
Figure 5: Average age at first and sample CEO position 65,0 60,0 55,0 53,2 52,6 52,1 52,2 52,4 51,4 average age 51,1 51,1 50,7 49,0 50,0 50,6 49,9 49,4 47,8 47,6 47,2 45,0 46,4 46,1 45,5 45,3 40,0 35,0 34 39 39 41 42 44 48 46 44 47 year n first CEO position CEO position of the sample Two observations stand out. First, over the whole period the average age when first appointed CEO declines by five years from 51 years in to 46 years in This drop is twice as big as the decline of the average age when appointed CEO of the sample over the whole period.
Second, the gap between the two average ages doubles between and In the last year of observation the difference amounts five years which matches the commonly agreed contract duration for CEOs. Whereas both average ages develop quite similar in the first half of the observation period, the gap between both increases after The observation that German managers increasingly provide experience as CEO when being promoted to CEO of one of the top 50 companies in Germany can be interpreted as an approximation towards management as a unified profession.
Especially the finding that on average they reach their first CEO position in the second half of their forties suggests a compression of their careers. In comparison with their predecessors of they have on average five years less to prove themselves as prospective executive manager. At the same time this development seems to provide further evidence for a decentralization of company structures.
The reorganization of firms into parent and subsidiary companies increases the number of CEO positions within the same company group when the latter are run self-contained. But an increase in the degree of competition not only seems to stem from the growing number of potential successors. Figure 6 reports how the average tenure of the German corporate elite has evolved over time.
Unlike the other career aspects presented above the development of the average tenure is unambiguous. During the first half of the period of observation the average tenure proves quite stable. From the mids onwards, however, the average tenure constantly declines. The mean tenure being 8. The long tenures of German CEOs were seen as being related to the principle of collective responsibility, practiced on the German management boards. In this context, mistakes in the business strategy could not easily be ascribed to one particular person. However, with a more hierarchical board structure the CEO has a more 10 At the time of analysis not all tenures of the years and had been finished.
This concerns one case in and seven in For these cases the tenure was estimated by assuming the affected CEOs would stay in office until turning 65, the common age of retirement. The decisive decline of the average tenure seems to indicate that German CEOs are becoming less sheltered from performance expectations of their environment. Unlike in earlier days, the competition for the CEO position does not end after the appointment, as incumbents are more and more critically eyed from the inside by aspiring successors as well as the outside by stockholders and business partners.
Conclusion The aim of this paper was to contribute to the discussion on the presence and future of the German styled capitalism from an elite-sociological perspective. Author: Friedrich Lenger. More Options Prices excl. Add to Cart. View PDF Flyer. Contents About. Pages: i—xii. Pages: 1— Pages: 11— Pages: 33— Pages: 67— Pages: 95— Im heutigen Bulgarien, das im Jahrhundert Grenzland war, bevor die osmanische Expansion nach Norden weiter voranschritt, wurden z.
Auf der anderen Seite der Grenze entwickelten die Nachbarn des Osmanischen Reiches ebenfalls spezielle Regime, um ihre Grenzen zu befestigen und zu verteidigen. Auf venezianischem Gebiet wurde eine vergleichbare Grenzorganisation geschaffen. An erster Stelle ist darauf zu verweisen, dass die Einbindung des Balkans in imperiale Kontexte dies betrifft auch das venezianische Kolonialreich die Region in unmittelbare Verbindung mit anderen Teilen des jeweiligen Reichs brachte. Gleichzeitig waren die Geschicke der drei Reiche durch Kriege, Handel , Diplomatie und andere Faktoren miteinander aufs Engste verflochten.
Aber auch in nominell direkt verwalteten Gebieten gab es diverse Sonderregelungen, z. Im von Venedig kontrollierten Gebiet dominierte das sogenannte Kolonat, eine der Teilpacht vergleichbare Eigentumsform. Jahrhunderts die Zentralmacht wieder die Oberhand gewann. Da das Patriarchat vom wohlhabenden, griechischsprachigen Kaufmannsmilieu im Fanar-Viertel der Hauptstadt daher auch Fanarioten genannt dominiert wurde, erhielt die orthodoxe Kirche ein dezidiert griechisches Antlitz.
Die Dominanz des Griechischen als Liturgiesprache auch in den nichtgriechischen Gebieten des Balkans sollte zum Ausgangspunkt der bulgarischen Nationalbewegung werden, die ihren ersten Erfolg mit der Einrichtung einer autokephalen bulgarischen Kirche durch den Sultan im Jahr feierte. Jahrhundert eine im Ansatz moderne Verwaltung herausbildete. Mit dem Aufkommen nationaler Bewegungen im Auch im Wesentlich weniger Aufmerksamkeit widmeten die Regierungen der neuen Nationalstaaten im Dominant blieb eine relativ unproduktive und in weiten Teilen subsistenzorientierte Landwirtschaft, nur hier und dort gab es kleine Inseln der Industrialisierung.
Konfessionen, wobei in der Summe die Muslime die meisten Opfer zu beklagen hatten. Die neuen Nationalstaaten betrieben im "langen" Griechenland und Jugoslawien befanden sich hingegen unter deutscher, italienischer bis September und bulgarischer Besatzung. Auch die Infrastruktur wurde ausgebaut, und die Bildungsstandards wurden deutlich angehoben.
Jahrhundert erschwert wurde. Anatolien auf. Dies betraf nicht nur die Imperien, sondern etwa auch die Einbindung in den "Westen" bzw. Ulf Brunnbauer. Volkswagenstiftung Hg.