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This course is a seminar on the philosophy of Leibniz. Among other topics, we will examine why Leibniz thought that everything has an explanation, why God exists, why God creates the best possible world, why the world is not purely material, why the world ultimately consists of immaterial monads, and how the appreciation of all this can facilitate human happiness. David Barnett Tuesday This course will focus on recent debates in social epistemology, particularly those concerning the rationality of trust in oneself and in others. Our central questions will include:.

Thomas Hurka Tuesday This seminar will examine a number of views about the good, i. Others are found in larger entities such as societies; they include equality in the distribution of happiness; distribution by merit or desert; and the environmental good of a complex ecosystem. The aim will be to survey a wide range of things that can be held to be good in themselves.

Brendan De Kenessey Wednesday Why is lying wrong? Trying to answer this deceptively simple question will lead us to explore a wide range of topics in ethics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and political philosophy. Is there a morally relevant difference between lying and other forms of deception? When is it rational to trust what others say? What is the difference between saying something false and merely implying something false?

Should freedom of speech protect a right to lie? One way to think of the philosophy of science is as epistemology and metaphysics of science. Bayesian philosophy of science is philosophy of science from a probabilistic point of view, where probabilities are interpreted in terms of degrees of belief. Topics in Bayesian philosophy of science include: confirmation and induction, scientific realism, learning conditionals, the problem of old evidence, causation, explanation, inter-theoretic reduction, simplicity, scientific objectivity, as well as model selection and idealization.

It will be helpful to have taken PHL prior to this course, or to do so simultaneously. If this is not an option for you, it is a good idea to familiarize yourself with a textbook on probability and inductive logic such as:. New York: Oxford University Press. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. It will be helpful to have taken PHL prior to this course. Evaluation: The decision! Shruta Swarup Wednesday Most of us have prudential reasons to comply with the laws of our state.

But is there a moral duty to obey these laws, and if so, what is its ground? In this seminar, we will examine these arguments as well as the skeptical replies of critics. Advanced study of some topic in an area of applied ethics, including bioethics, environmental ethics, and so on. Sophia Moreau Wednesday We will also think about the role of stereotypes in discrimination, and about the relative obligations of private individuals and the State.

Ross Upshur Thursdays Advanced study of topics in bioethics, taught in conjunction with clinical bioethicists associated with the health care organization partners of the University of Toronto Joint Centre for Bioethics. Therefore, insofar as Bergson wants to overcome analysis, we can also say that he wants to overcome modern metaphysics. For Bergson, as we shall see shortly, intuition is self-sympathy, even introspection.

But the specific kind of introspection that Bergson thinks leads to absolute knowledge is not the slender experience of my current state of mind. Self-dilation puts us in contact with what Bergson famously calls the duration, the temporal flow of experience. This flow includes a kind of unity and a kind of multiplicity, a kind of continuity and a kind of heterogeneity, which means that through self-dilation I come into contact with something other than myself. Intuition does not enclose me, but opens me to the outside. In Bergsonian intuition therefore we find the basic impulse of all continental philosophy.

Starting from a certain inside, it is driven by an impulse to exit. The impulse to the outside requires the reconception of thinking. Like Heidegger, Bergson too calls for such a reconception when he tries to reconceive the very concept of concept. He calls for this reconception because the duration is in itself inexpressible and yet knowledge of it given in intuition requires expression, even conceptual expression.

It shows that thinking is capable of more than Platonizing. But first in our commentary, let us see what Bergson does with immanent subjective experience. If our knowledge is absolute, then metaphysics is possible. The habitual work of intelligence serves a practical interest; it consists in going from the general concepts that we have already acquired to the things.

The general concepts classify things, separating them and juxtaposing them; when classified, the things are then labeled, and by means of these labels, the general concepts allow the things to be manipulated for our own benefit. But what is intuition in Bergson? Bergson makes the distinction between analysis and intuition along the line of inside and outside. Analysis always results in symbolization.

In analysis our access to the thing is mediated by these partial viewpoints and these symbols; thus it is relative and abstract. So, in contrast to both analysis and synthesis, intuition in Bergson involves no viewpoints and supports itself on no symbols used in a reconstruction. Therefore, intuitive knowledge in Bergson is absolute and, we must say, even a-perspectival. If I look at my arm lifting from the outside, I perceive the moving and the changes according to viewpoints. Being points, the viewpoints look to be points on a line, which can then be coordinated on a grid.

The points on the grid, which are unrelated to one another and all homogeneously the same, can be expressed by one symbol. Now, translated into a spatial grid of points, into a symbol, the movement no longer moves. So, in contrast, when I perceive my arm lifting from the inside, I sense change and changes immediately.

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But the sensing changes not according to the different viewpoints adopted; rather as my arm moves, my feelings change. But any example of bodily movement will illuminate the distinction. When I am running, I experience or sense change all the time, but I do not take the movement apart and coordinate it with spatial axes; I do not symbolize the movement on a grid.

To do this coordination, I would have to be standing still, not running. I would have to be perceiving the running from the outside. The second example is a literary example. The novel would recount thousands of incidents, but these thousands of incidents would be only viewpoints taken on the character. This description of what the novelist does means that the reader remains outside the character, in the divided, multiple elements. Duration and Consciousness Of course, the infinite that is given in intuition—after the reversal of the normal work of intelligence—and that with which metaphysics concerns itself is the flow or movement of experience within the self.

The duration does not consist in multiple separate states. For Bergson, the duration is primarily defined by continuity, more precisely continuity without contiguity or juxtaposition, or continuity with heterogeneity. Being unique, the duration cannot be conceived by means of resemblances and comparisons. Each of the images is necessarily inadequate to the flow of the duration.

The first image of the duration is two spools, with a tape running between them, one spool unwinding the tape, the other winding it up. The benefit of this image is that it presents a continuity of experiences without juxtaposition. Yet there is a drawback to it: Because a tape moves between the two spools, the image presents the duration as being homogeneous, as if one could fold the tape back over other parts of it, as if the tape were superposable, implying that two moments in consciousness might be identical and homogeneous. The duration, for Bergson, is continuity of progress and heterogeneity.

Continuity, Bergson realizes, never makes difference vanish; difference becomes internal. Indeed, for Bergson, and this is the center of his truly novel idea of memory, memory conserves the past and this conservation does not imply that one experiences the same re-cognition , but difference. One moment is added onto the old ones, and thus, when the next moment occurs, it is added onto all the other old ones plus the one that came immediately before. Although Bergson does not say this, one might say that Tuesday is different from Monday because Monday only includes itself and Sunday, while Tuesday includes itself, Monday, and Sunday.

The second image is the color spectrum. Since a color spectrum has a multiplicity of different shades or nuances, the second image helps us see that the duration is constant difference or heterogeneity, precisely the characteristic of the duration that was lacking in the spool image. But there is a drawback to the color spectrum image as well. With the color spectrum, we lose the characteristic of continuity or unity since the spectrum has colors juxtaposed. The color spectrum is a spatial image, while the duration is time. We come then to the third image, which is an elastic being stretched.

Bergson tells us first to contract the elastic to a mathematical point, which represents the now of our experience, then draw it out to make a line growing progressively longer. But he warns us not to focus on the line but on the action that traces it. If we can focus on the action of tracing, then we can see that the movement—which is duration—is not only continuous and differentiating or heterogeneous, but also indivisible. We can always insert breaks into the spatial line that represents the motion, but the motion itself is indivisible.

In Bergson, there is always a priority of movement over the thing that moves; the thing that moves is an abstraction from the movement. Now, the elastic being stretched is a more exact image of duration. But the image of the elastic is still, according to Bergson, incomplete. With this image, we forget the wealth of coloring as we saw in the color spectrum characteristic of the duration as it is lived. Instead, with the elastic we see only the simple movement of consciousness as it goes from one shade to another. We can see a progression here: from intuition to image to concept.

But we can say now that Bergson needs some sort of conceptual representation in order to communicate the knowledge that intuition provides. This multiplicity—as we shall see, it is a qualitative multiplicity—does not mean that we have no unity. There is always a continuity of elements being prolonged into one another. As well then, we have a unity like no other. No matter how I arrange the two concepts frozen representations or symbols of unity and multiplicity, according to Bergson, I shall never obtain anything that resembles the simple intuition of duration.

Where have the concepts come from? They have come from the analysis of the mind, not an intuition of it. Component Part and Partial Expression15 Psychology, like all the sciences, starts from the results of analysis. Even if the psychologist finds some change in the state, he or she says there is not a simple sensation but several successive sensations. The psychologist then transfers the characteristic of being immutable to each successive sensation, like the translation of movement into immobile points on a grid. The immobility or immutability of the partial expressions allows psychology to have a solid foundation, but psychological analysis not Freudian psychoanalysis, about which Bergson seems not to have known much never penetrates the self.

Bergson explains the distinction between component parts and partial expressions by means of two images. First, Bergson compares the work of the psychologist to the artist. An artist who is visiting Paris would make a sketch of a tower of Notre Dame. The tower is inseparably connected to the edifice, which is inseparably connected to the soil, to the surrounding city of Paris, etc. The artist must begin by detaching the tower, making note of an aspect of the whole, which is this specific tower. The result is a certain viewpoint based in a certain mode of representation.

Likewise, the psychologist starts by extracting a psychological state from the whole person. This isolated state is nothing more than a sketch, from which an artificial recomposition begins. The sketch is the whole under a certain elementary aspect in which the psychologist is interested. The second image is that of a poem. This is an important quotation. It is from this intuition of a continuous trait or feature that I must descend back to the disassembled parts in order to reconstitute the whole poem.

The terminology of parts and whole partial expressions and composite parts , or singularity and multiplicity really indicates what intuition is for Bergson. While not being an external viewpoint, and thus while not being perspectival, intuition is an internal finite opening onto an infinite mobility. The illusion is that one takes the negation of self-intuition, analysis, as the proper method for understanding the self.

Through analysis—and what else could it give us? But the psychological states are not the self. Philosophical empiricism, building on psychological analysis, suffers from the same illusion of taking the translation for the original; it says that the original does not exist since it cannot be found in the translation.

For Bergson, rationalism is no better than empiricism. Even though for rationalism, the self too disappears behind the translation, it persists in affirming—unlike empiricism, which denies—the unity of the person. Since rationalism too looks for the unity of the self in the psychological states, it recognizes that the determinations provided by those states cannot define the self. Bergson finally reduces the two positions to this sole difference. On the one hand, since empiricism looks for the unity of the self in the interstices of psychological states, in these empty spaces that are never completely filled in, the self tends toward Zero.

According to Bergson, no mixing of these two positions—a thesis and an antithesis—no mixing of this abstract multiple and this abstract one will give us the moving life of the person, the person that endures. Variability for Bergson is not the variation of a thing; the thing that varies is an abstraction from variability just as the thing that moves is an abstraction from mobility. Instead of a passive feeling, intuition in Bergson then is an activity; intuition always requires effort.

To explain this idea, Bergson refers us back to the image of the color spectrum. Or, more precisely, I would say, the inferior and superior objects are in a certain sense in me because our or my psychological duration is a component part of the duration; my psychological duration is in the whole duration. At the two limits, we would find on the one hand all matter and repetition, and on the other all memory and difference. In other words, as a reversal of Platonism, modern philosophy and modern science is Cartesian.

Here Bergson is no longer thinking of Descartes; he is now thinking of Kant. The modern elevation of the soul over the idea therefore has not completed the reversal of Platonism. It must be overcome, and being based in analysis as a kind of barely reworked Platonism , modern metaphysics and modern science must be overcome.

As we shall see in chapter 4, Heidegger will make a similar criticism of the faculty of the understanding or the intellect der Verstand. To overcome analysis and its determinative role in modern metaphysics and science, we must place the faculty of understanding back within the faculty of intuition, making the understanding once more dependent on experience. But here, experience is immanent subjective experience reconceived as the duration.

The duration completes the reversal of Platonism and shows the true meaning of the modern elevation of the soul. The Bergsonian duration transforms the concept of immanence. We have moved beyond Cartesianism. Let us again examine the Bergsonian duration. For Bergson, the duration is a qualitative multiplicity—as opposed to a quantitative multiplicity. Thus a quantitative multiplicity is always homogeneous. But we also notice that we can enumerate the sheep, despite their homogeneity. We are able to enumerate them because each sheep is spatially separated from or juxtaposed to the others; in other words, each occupies a discernible spatial location.

Therefore, quantitative multiplicities are homogeneous and spatial. But in a qualitative multiplicity, heterogeneity does not imply juxtaposition; it implies continuity. As with quantitative multiplicity, Bergson in Time and Free Will gives us many examples of qualitative multiplicity.

So the Time and Free Will description of sympathy shows us how closely together Bergson conceives intuition and duration; one and the same description counts for both. According to Bergson, our experience of sympathy begins with our putting ourselves in the place of others, in feeling their pain.

But if sympathy consisted only in feeling the pain of others, sympathy would inspire in us abhorrence of others, and we would want to avoid them, not help them. Bergson concedes that the feeling of horror may be at the root of sympathy. One realizes that one can do without certain sensuous goods; one is superior over them since one has managed to dissociate oneself from them. In the end, one feels humility, humble since one is now stripped of these sensuous goods. The feelings are continuous with one another; they interpenetrate one another, and importantly there is an opposition between inferior needs and superior needs, between abasement and aspiration.

A qualitative multiplicity is therefore heterogeneous or virtually singularized , continuous or interpenetrating , oppositional or dualistic at the extremes, and progressive or temporal, an irreversible flow, which is not given all at once. The problem is this: In order for intuitive knowledge to be communicated, it requires a linguistic form, yet concepts in the proper or literal sense cannot capture the duration. Simply, concepts in the proper sense are frozen, while the duration is fluid. A concept in the proper or literal sense of the term is a concept formed by analysis.

As we know, in analysis the perceiver occupies a viewpoint outside the object. From what is perceived at that viewpoint, a property is abstracted. The abstracted property then is compared to other viewpoints and other objects. The commonality is a simple concept. Through the comparison, the property acquires a larger and larger extension. Once these classificatory genera are formed, they look to be prior to experience, the result being that we always start from these frozen concepts from the faculty of the understanding and then we go to experience.

Experience becomes nothing more than content to be molded by concepts. A proper concept is a mold into which experience is poured. With frozen concepts, it looks as though our thought is able to do nothing but Platonize. In contrast, fluid concepts show that our thinking is capable of more than Platonizing. But that inner experience of which we speak will nowhere find a strictly appropriate language. This is a crucial comment for understanding Bergsonian fluid concepts.

In it, Bergson provides a negative definition: a fluid concept does not contain the entire experience. So, while concepts in the proper sense are general ideas whose extension applies to many different things a property common to all of them —proper concepts attempt to take, grasp, or capture, conceive in the literal sense the entire experience—a fluid concept an improper concept would not be a general idea, not a common property; it would not extend to many things.

The attempt to make the concept fit solely one thing is why Bergson distinguishes, for instance, between two senses of knowledge—intuition versus analysis. We might think that an improper concept would be imprecise. But because it does not contain the entire experience, an improper or metaphorical concept is more precise than general concepts. We are able to recapitulate the distinction between frozen concepts and fluid concepts in the following way.

First, a concept in the proper sense molds experience, while a concept in the improper sense is molded by experience. This first distinction implies a reversal between frozen and fluid concepts. For frozen concepts, one goes from the concept to the experience; for a fluid concept, one goes from the experience to the concept.

Second, a concept in the proper sense extends to many things. In contrast, an improper concept extends to only one thing. Proper concepts are generalities, while improper concepts are antigeneralities or singularities. But there is another reason for their impropriety. Third, a concept is proper when it is subtracted from anything figurative or imagistic. In contrast, a concept is improper when an image is added to it. The addition of the images, however, does not extend the scope of the concept.

In fact, the additional images do the reverse of extension. The images indicate what is not contained in the concept. Fourth, while concepts in the proper sense seem to contain the entire experience, fluid concepts do not contain the entire experience. In order to understand the enlargement of a concept with images, let us return to the concept of intuition. The concept of intuition must be distinguished from analysis or the understanding. Analysis is the indirect view of something.

If we say that it is something like a mathematical point, we are confronted with a problem: If each instant is a point, then how are we to get a line out of the points? We cannot say that what lies between the instants are intervals of time since we have already hypothetically reduced time to the juxtaposition of instants. Therefore the two points or instants seem to be separated by nothing. We must conclude by saying they are really only one thick point. According to Bergson, for Berkeley, matter is a thin, transparent film between humans and God.

The word is like the mathematical point of the present, which being thickened takes on an immense extension, as if it captures all existence, as if it were a cloud of dust. We must take note of some of the French words in this quotation. As a direction, the sense of a speech is something fluid, mobile, which we follow as we listen.

At this moment, the present is the sentence with which I am concerned to pronounce. My present is the sentence I am uttering right now. My attention is turned toward the present sentence; the field of my attention is limited to the current sentence. The sharp points of the compass mark the distance spanned by the attention of speaking or hearing the span from the beginning of a sentence to the end of that sentence.

The sharp points are also punctuation points; punctuation marks connect words together and do not allow a word or syllable to be set up as independent. But the punctuation marks are also sharp points; the sharp points do not allow syllables to merge themselves into one syllable or words to merge themselves into one word. Here with the image of the compass there is no cloud of dust. Yet the two sharp points of the compass can be enlarged. So if I wanted, I could with effort make the distance greater than the current sentence.

I would then include the sentence that went ahead of the one with which I am concerned to pronounce now. But we could go further. With effort, the dilation could include the events that preceded the lecture, and as large a part of our past as we desire. But now with the images added onto the concept of intuition, we see that the formal definition of intuition does not contain the entire experience. We should not forget that the definition fits the experience since the experience is not one of analysis. But the image of dilation and its associated images of the mathematical point, the thick cloud of dust, the voice or speech, and the sharp points of the compass tell us more about intuition than does the definition.

The image of dilation does not suggest the indirect access to something by means of symbolic recomposition; it does not suggest analysis. Yet it suggests some sort of indirectness because there is no dilation without effort. Finally, the image of the sharp points of the compass suggests that intuition is not limited to self-intuition.

The articulations it makes indicate that the duration always exceeds what is given to me in intuition, that the duration is always other than me, that the duration is always larger, that it is still outside, that it is the outside. Overall, the images indicate that the concept of intuition does not contain the entire experience of the duration. In fact, the colored fringe of the images indicates that the concept is unfinished. The concept is not a frozen mold. Once again, we can say that thought is capable of more than Platonizing.

The principle is found in his Creative Evolution. In order to lead us to the idea that the whole is not given, Bergson distinguishes between two senses of possibility. On the one hand, there is the sense of possibility in which something is possible because there is no obstacle to its being realized. Bergson says, however in the first introduction to The Creative Mind , This [second positive sense of possibility] is an absurd conception in the case of a work of art, for from the moment that the musician has the precise and complete idea of the symphony he means to compose, his symphony is done.

The duration is always creative. The image implies that because the idea was not given at the beginning, prior to its realization, the movement of the duration has no absolute origin or first aim. Lacking an initial absolute determination, the duration therefore has no absolute end or final purpose. In other words, prior to the sense or direction of the duration, there is no one absolute sense. The lack of absolute determination frees the duration to create not only reality, but also possibilities. In other words, lacking a determinate aim and purpose, the duration never comes to an end; more duration is always possible.

Even though in Bergson attempts to renew metaphysics in light of its decline in the nineteenth century, the attempt at renewal in fact aims to overcome the modern metaphysics of subjectivity; and insofar as the modern metaphysics of subjectivity continues Platonism, Bergsonism attempts to overcome Platonism. The duration is a multiplicity like no other: a continuous heterogeneity. But the experience of the duration, intuition, is inexpressible.

As we have just seen, a fluid concept is fundamentally incomplete, just as the duration itself is. The fluid concept, while fitting the duration, while being enlarged with images, always calls for more thinking. Indeed, intuition and duration are virtually identical.

If that is so and if intuition is able to mold a fluid concept and, more than a fluid concept, a kind of discourse, if it is able to call forth thought, then we have to say that the duration is not alien to language or that language is not alien to the duration. This direction for Bergson is larger than my conscious present. On the other hand, since we have access to the unconscious only through the derivatives, the question becomes how we can conceive the relation between the unconscious and the conscious.

In other words, how does the unconscious become conscious? As we are going to see, the relation between consciousness and the unconscious is defined by translation and therefore by language. Freudian psychoanalysis therefore anticipates the great reflections on language that we find in the later Heidegger, in the later Merleau-Ponty, and Foucault.

Freud discovers schizophrenic thought. If repression has led to some sort of mental illness such as neurosis, the cure consists in allowing the sublation to happen. When the sublation occurs, then we are able to gain knowledge of recognize the unconscious. But is it possible to know the unconscious? To be able to explain phenomena such as slips of the tongue and dreams, phenomena that remain inexplicable for consciousness, we must presuppose the unconscious. The identification of my consciousness with that of other humans has however withstood the critique.

But when applied to oneself, this inference does not lead to the disclosure of an unconscious. Freud lays out three aspects of this legitimate critique. First, a consciousness of which the bearer knows nothing is something other than a foreign consciousness; moreover, lacking its most important characteristic, immediate knowledge, this consciousness is not worthy of discussion.

Instead of an unconscious psychical process, we seem to have the inconsistent idea of an unconscious consciousness.

We would then have to assume a third or fourth or an unlimited number of states of consciousness all unknown to us and to one another, which is another inconsistent idea. So Freud concludes that we have grounds for modifying our inference about ourselves. What is proved is that there is no second consciousness in us; rather, there is the existence of certain psychical acts deprived of consciousness.

Freud therefore aims to correct inner perception. The contribution of Kantian critique to psychoanalysis lies in the fact that the appearance of the object of external perception is not identical to what it is in reality. This difference between appearance and reality implies that the objects of inner perception are more alien to me than an alien consciousness. Nevertheless, the objects of inner perception are less unknowable than the external world because, unlike the external world, the unconscious produces derivatives of itself.

The Various Meanings of the Unconscious and the Topological Viewpoint The analogy of the unconscious to an alien consciousness indicates that a terminological clarification of the unconscious is required. On the other hand, the term refers to processes entirely foreign to consciousness; it then refers to the system unconscious abbreviated as Ucs, while the system conscious is abbreviated as Cs.

According to Freud, usually a psychical act goes through two phases.

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First, the psychical act is unconscious and belongs to the system Ucs. The system Pcs shares the characteristics of the Cs. It is this passage and its barrier—the testing-censorship—that suggests that the psyche is a topography. On the one hand, the topography and the dynamic description of psychical processes such as repression makes us see that psychoanalysis differs from the descriptive psychology of consciousness. Or are we to believe instead that the transposition consists in an alteration of the state, which is fulfilled in the so-called material and in the same locality?

Freud does not provide an answer to it until the seventh and last section of the essay. Then he considers the value of the two hypotheses. That is, if the idea is not inhibited by the censorship, it regularly advances from one position to another. Freud reports that if a patient is told about one of his or her repressed ideas, this information does not change the repression. The patient now has in actual fact the same idea in two forms in two separate localities in his or her psychical apparatus.

So for the moment, according to Freud, we cannot decide between the two possible hypotheses of how to define the difference between a conscious and an unconscious idea. But we can see that the unconscious idea must be experienced, which leads us to the question of emotions.

Even in the unconscious, the drive can be represented only by the idea. This conclusion would seem to imply that we should never be able to speak of an unconscious feeling. Although the drive-impulse is never present as such, never felt as such, although it is mediated by its representative idea, feelings are felt, that is, they are always conscious. An affect or a feeling-impulse is always connected to a representative. In other words, although the affect was never unconscious, its representational idea had undergone repression.

This quantitative factor refers us to an energetics or economic description. According to Freud here, an affect may be subjected to three different destinies: either it remains, wholly or in part, as it is; or it is transformed into a qualitatively different charge of affect, above all into anxiety Angst ; or its development is hindered altogether.

When repression has succeeded in driving out the affect, that affect is, according to Freud, unconscious. The discharge then remains a potential. Repression aims at inhibiting the transformation of a drive-impulse into affective externalization the discharge as the satisfaction of pleasure. The struggle between the two systems at first involves the affect appearing directly in the system Cs. In fact, the nature of the substitutive idea determines the qualitative character of the affect; it changes the content of the idea. Freud now provides a clear example of how the substitutive idea determines the affect.

So something else must have been withdrawn. Repression withdraws the affect the Cs system put into the idea. In other words, it withdraws the reaction to the appearance of the idea, the reaction of anxiety. But this withdrawal leaves the unconscious drive and its investment in place. Since drives are incessant, the same process of withdrawal would have to happen interminably. In short, the result would not be repression.

The anticharge is the sole mechanism of primal repression, that is, the repression of the drives and their objects that occurs in childhood. It is very possible, Freud thinks, that the preconscious charge withdrawn from the idea is the very one used for anti-charge. The withdrawal of investment brings us to the economic view of the psychical apparatus. In regard to transference neurosis, however, Freud lays out three phases.

The first phase occurs when anxiety occurs without the person a child knowing what has caused the anxiety. What has happened is that in the Ucs there was present some sexual impulse libido , which demanded to be transferred into the system Pcs. In other words, a charged idea representing a sexual impulse makes itself present to the child; rather than discharging the quantity of excitation in the idea as pleasurable actions, the child undergoes anxiety.

The affect of anxiety makes it seem as though the charged sexual idea were a perceived threat from the outside from which the child could flee. The repression therefore is not yet successful. The affect of anxiety nevertheless has set up the second phase.

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The second phase occurs when the idea presents itself again and again and again. The conquering of anxiety occurs through transference, that is, the charge attaches itself to a substitute idea. The two ideas—the rejected idea and the substitute idea—must be tied together by means of association.

Here Freud is describing animal phobia. The idea of the dog becomes the substitute idea. In other words, the idea of the dog secures the Cs system against the emergence into consciousness of the repressed idea; it has become the anti-charge since it is now invested with anxiety a quantity of energy or excitation. The child has become free of the father, but now has anxiety in the face of the dog from which the child is able to flee. The substitute formation is a protective structure, a defensive enclave, a first line of defense, a defense mechanism.

The defense mechanism begins to operate only when the substitute idea the idea of the dog has successfully taken over the representation of what has been repressed the idea of the father. The defense mechanism attempts to isolate the substitutive idea the idea of a particular dog so that it does not produce a new excitation. Excitation at any point of the protective structure gives rise to a slight degree of the development of anxiety. The slight degree of anxiety is used as a signal to inhibit; it results in a new flight from any further development of anxiety.

The further the sensitive and vigilant anti-charge becomes extended around the anxiety-producing substitute idea, the more exactly is the mechanism able to function.

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Perhaps at first, it was a particularly vicious dog in the neighborhood that occasioned the anxiety. Then the anxiety is generalized to all dogs, and then perhaps to the houses where the dogs reside even when the dogs are away, and then to the street where the houses are, etc. Where before there was only one point a particular dog where the repressed idea could break through and produce anxiety, now it is able to break through with the whole protective structure of the phobia: any street where any dogs live produces a slight feeling of anxiety.

Repression succeeds in inhibiting the discharge of anxiety by keeping the child within the ramparts of the substitute formation. The defense mechanism, however, never operates with complete security because one of the peculiar characteristics of the unconscious is its persistence. Negation, as Freud says, is at a higher level, a substitute for repression.

By means of displacement Verschiebung , one idea may gain the whole charge of another. Or by condensation Verdichtung , one idea may gain the charges of many ideas. In fact, they bear no relation to time at all; the time relation is bound up with the work of the system Cs. Freud turns to the characteristics of the system Pcs.

In the Pcs, displacement and condensation are excluded or very much restricted. The exclusion and restriction of the processes of condensation and displacement leads Freud to assume two different stages of charged energy in psychical life. There is one more characteristic of the system Pcs. In other words, the system Pcs is the location where ideas are tested against what reality permits.

Conscious memory seems to depend entirely on the Pcs. It must be distinguished from memory traces, in which experiences of the Ucs become registered. The difference between conscious memories and memory traces suggests again the two-registrations hypothesis, but this hypothesis has already been shown to be inadequate. So here is the list of the characteristics of the system Pcs: inhibition of charge; restriction and exclusion of condensation and displacement; and communication between the systems Ucs and Cs, conscious memory.

While we just saw Freud differentiate the systems, now he will show us the intersystemic circulation. Freud reasserts this observation: the Ucs does not remain at rest while the Pcs does all the psychical work. The Ucs is not something left over and undone by childhood development. On the contrary, the Ucs is living; it is capable of development and maintains a number of other relations to the Pcs. Some of the derivatives are hardly distinguishable from the Cs insofar as they are not contradictory; and yet, even though we would expect them to be able to enter consciousness, the same derivatives are unconscious and cannot become conscious.

So qualitatively they belong to the system Pcs, but in fact they descend from Ucs; the descent is decisive for their destiny. Freud mentions fantasy formations in normal people and in neurotics as examples of qualitatively organized derivatives that cannot become conscious. But other derivatives, as we saw with the animal phobia, go through distortion and are able to become conscious.

Thus the former censorship is exercised against the Ucs itself, while the latter works against the preconscious derivatives. It is the part of the psychical apparatus—the surface—related to the external world. There is material that belongs to consciousness but that can be temporarily latent. According to Freud, observation shows that the material sharing the attributes of the system Pcs does not become conscious.

Moreover, the entry into consciousness is circumscribed by certain dispositions of attention; as we saw already, if the child must pay attention to dogs, it stops the entry into consciousness of the idea of the father. The formation of the dog idea substitute, according to Freud, does not happen in consciousness. The ego therefore is the agency of the censorships. It seems that all the paths from external perception to the Ucs normally remain open; only the paths from the Ucs to the Cs are subject to repression.

Although these paths from the external to the internal normally remain open, it is not clear, according to Freud, how much influence the Cs system can have on the Ucs. Nevertheless, psychoanalytic treatment aims to have the Cs influence the Ucs. Treatment consists in the patient being required to form derivatives of the Ucs freely; the patient is directed to overcome the objections of the censorship against the preconscious formation becoming conscious.

A super-charge occurs when the two forces, so to speak, meet up and join forces, making a charge greater than either charge alone, as for instance in the animal phobia example, when the charge of the idea of the father joins forces with the anxiety about the idea of dogs. But here, by speaking of psychoanalytic treatment, Freud is implying that the most important derivatives involve speech.

Since the psychoanalytic treatment obligates the patient to speak, we are led to the problem of schizophrenia. Recognition Agnoszierung of the Unconscious Freud turns to schizophrenia because this neurosis—narcissistic psychoneurosis—may be able to tell us more about the unconscious, more than what we have learned so far from transference neuroses such as childhood animal phobia. In schizophrenic autism, there is a split between the external world and the internal world; in dementia praecox—precocious, adolescent madness—there is withdrawal, with delusions and hallucinations.

As we saw above, the ego in Freud unifies the libido and directs it toward an object, a substitute. In transference neurosis, although the charge seemed to shift from one object to another, the charge being placed in some object was retained even in repression. Indeed, because the charge can be transferred, transference is useful in psychoanalytic therapy. In order to elaborate on these verbal changes, Freud appropriates observations based on three patients.

The second patient is male. He has withdrawn from all interest in life because he has bad skin; he has blackheads and deep holes in his face that everyone notices. Working on the blackheads remorselessly, he received satisfaction in squeezing them out, because, as he said, something spurted out when he did so.

He took hours to wash and dress; in particular, putting on his socks presented difficulties. Like the first patient, he explained himself. From the observations of these three patients, Freud draws four conclusions. Second, there is a difference between the way the feeling occurs in the schizophrenic and in the hysteric. Yet, the third conclusion makes the schizophrenic look like the hysteric. In schizophrenia, Freud notes, words are subject to the same processes as those that form dream images, the primary processes of condensation and displacement.

So, by means of such processes, the charge of the object has been transferred to the words. But the processes of condensation and displacement make the schizophrenic symptoms and formations resemble those of the transference neurotic, the hysteric. This strange feeling brings us to the fourth conclusion. The schizophrenic lack of coincidence between the idea of the thing and the idea of the word leads Freud to define the conscious idea of the object in this way: What we could permissibly call the conscious idea of the object can now be carved up into the idea of the word verbal idea and the idea of the thing concrete idea ; the latter consists in the charge, if not of the direct memory-images of the things, at least of remoter memory-traces derived from these.

First, let us recall the question as it appeared earlier in the essay: When a psychical act we restrict ourselves to those that have the nature of an idea undergoes the transposition from the system Ucs into the system Cs or Pcs, are we to presume that this transposition involves a new registration comparable to a second record of the idea in question, situated, moreover, in a new psychical locality and side by side with which the original unconscious record continues to exist?

The two are not, as we supposed, different records of the same content situated in different psychical localities, nor yet different functional states of charge in the same locality; but the conscious idea comprises the concrete idea [Sachvorstellung: representation or idea of the thing understood as a subject matter] plus the idea of the word corresponding to it, while the unconscious idea is that of the thing alone [Sachvorstellung]. First, there is the topographical view; there are regions of the psyche, which means that the psyche is spatial but not in a normal sense and not in a sense correlated with anatomy.

But then, second, there is the energetic view of the psychic apparatus. Freud speculates that the drives are quantities of psychic energy, charges seeking discharge. Then, third, there is the dynamic view; the drives are mobile and, being mobile, they can be invested in or placed in, they can occupy and charge different ideas. This is a negative definition, telling us that the answer to the question is neither of the two hypotheses first considered: neither two different records of the same content in different places nor different states of charge in the same place.

Specifically, the neither-nor definition means that the answer consists in the same state of charge in different places and different content in the same place. In other words, the charge must have the same intensity in different localities, that is, in both the Ucs and the Cs systems, and what is charged must be different, that is, both the idea of the thing and the idea of the word must be charged in the same system, in the Cs system.

The transposition of an unconscious idea of the thing occurs when it is translated into the idea of words that bear the sense. But in fact, the sameness of sense between the idea of the thing and the idea of the word is not all that happens. When co-operation occurs, when there is a coincidence, the anti-charge has been converted to being the same charge as the unconscious one. In contrast, neurotics, in particular, lack the super-charge of the word. As we have seen, the specific characteristic of the schizophrenic is verbalization, the words.

Repression in the schizophrenic has withdrawn the charge from the places that represent the unconscious idea of the object.

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But it allows the ideas of the word corresponding to it to receive a more intense charge. According to Freud, the reason the schizophrenic can speak about his or her symptoms is that this speaking is the first part of the cure; through the words the making conscious of the idea of the object is at least potential.

With the words, however, what the schizophrenic is seeking is the lost object, the idea of the object into which the drive had placed a charge of affect demanding discharge. Being on the path of the words, the schizophrenic moves in one of the possible directions of our psychical activity. Either psychical activity starts from the drives, passes through the system Ucs, ending up at conscious activity of thought; or beginning with an external stimulus, it passes through the systems Cs and Pcs, ending in the Ucs with its charges of objects.

Despite repression, this second path must have remained open, and for some distance there is nothing blocking the efforts the neurosis makes to regain its object. At the end Freud makes a final comparison. Meta-psychology entirely concerns the derivatives, the substitutes, and the representatives. As we saw in animal phobia, the hysteric constructs an enclave, sets up walls, as if under attack. The Freudian topography—the difference between the Ucs and the Cs—is a battlefield.

The violent struggle at the borderline between the Cs and the Ucs the borderline of the Pcs with its multiple censorships is a struggle to the death. As is well known, the death drive appears in the compulsion to repeat. The death drive refers to the fact that the drives never had an absolute starting point or aim, an absolute determination: groundlessness.

Just as Bergson showed that the whole is not given, Freud shows that the original object is lacking. If the death drive consists in a compulsion to repeat, this repetition is not the repetition of an original model. The re-presentatives of the drives both the re-presentations of the thing, memory traces, and the re-presentatives of the words, acoustic images are nothing more than minimally repeatable traits. The re-presentatives are charged with energy, have directions and senses, but that energy is anarchic.

This genuine multiplicity is the outside. The liberation of energy liberates thought. This comment reinforces the importance of the substitutes, the derivatives, and the representatives. It means that the multiplicity of the unconscious is nothing but the residues of auditory images somehow charged with energy. To speak like Lacan again, the multiplicity is a multiplicity of signifiers.

The knot between the signifier and the signified has been untied. All is affirmed; no sublation takes place. The abstractness of schizophrenic thought is qualitatively differentiated and heterogeneous, since the slight similarity is not restricted to logical form and mutual contradiction. If we take seriously the absence of the determining object, the absence of the one absolute aim, then the association is necessarily heterogeneous.

Schizophrenic thought is timeless in the sense that it is not ordered chronologically, insofar as it is not ordered by a prior form. It appears that my consciousness is the foundation of the self, but in reality it is not. Meta-psychology begins with immanent, subjective experience, but goes beyond it. We must presume, according to Freud—it is necessary and legitimate—the existence of the unconscious.

Yet meta-psychology is speculative because the knowledge we have of the unconscious is always indirect; it is mediated by the substitutes, the derivatives, and the re-presentatives of the drives. In fact, when Freud discovers the great art of the schizophrenic in contrast to what happens in transference neurosis , he implies that no one absolute object or aim has ever determined the re-presentatives of the drives.

Freud goes beyond immanent subjective experience therefore to multiplicity. This is a genuine multiplicity continuous heterogeneity because it is a repetition not bound to a prior form. The re-presentatives are nothing more than the slight similarity of a repeatable trait. Finding a foundation deeper than consciousness, meta-psychology overcomes the psychology of consciousness.

On the one hand, like Bergsonism, it places consciousness within a larger system, that of the unconscious. It truly opens the way for the outside. On the other, by means of the priority of the derivatives, it raises the question of the being of language. On the surface, we find neither of these contributions in Husserl. Nevertheless, phenomenology is the dominant movement of continental philosophy in the twentieth century. Husserl adopts this method. These conditions are not transcendent or otherworldly.

Although they are immanent to experience, the conditions cannot, for Kant, be experienced; insofar as they are conditions, they must be different from experience. For Husserl, however, the conditions of experience must be able to be experienced; there must be intuitive evidence for them. So Husserl speaks of transcendental experience. Yet Husserl recognizes the need for the conditions to be different from experience. We see here with phenomenology that difference is the central issue: a difference within experience, a difference that produces a paradoxical ambiguity.

The Husserl text we are going to investigate appears much later than Ideas I. At the time of the writing, Heidegger had just published Being and Time. For the Encyclopedia Britannica entry, Heidegger wrote the first half of the second version. He introduces phenomenology historically and in terms of the question of the meaning of being; he defines phenomenology as the return to the being of pure subjectivity, consciousness. The collaboration fails.

Evidence of the failed collaboration can be seen in a letter from Heidegger to Husserl on October 22, ; here Heidegger criticizes the second draft Husserl had completed. Heidegger stresses that beings or entities with the sense of mundane being in the world cannot be explained by going back to entities with the same mode of being. But then he stresses that this difference does not mean that the transcendental is not an entity or being at all. On the one hand, it refers to a new kind of descriptive method, and on the other it refers to an a priori science derived from the method.

The phenomenological reforms apply first of all to empirical psychology. And once applied, we can then speak of phenomenological psychology. Phenomenology must be transcendental, not psychological. It is a strange and unfamiliar kind of thinking. So psychology looks to be a branch of anthropology or zoology. However, nature is the universal theme of a pure natural science.

A pure natural science would exclude all extraphysical predications of reality. Likewise, a pure psychology would take nothing physical into account. Is a pure psychology possible? So what we are trying to do here in this first part is disentangle psychology from physical science, the psyche or the egoical from nature. We are engaged in a project of purification.

Are you sure?

When we are engaged in a thing, even an ideal object such as a number, we are focused on the thing and not on the psychical experience as such. This reflection loses nothing of the world; instead, the things on which our gaze would be focused naturally are included in the psychical lived experiences; they have become phenomena.

Neo-Kantianism such as we find it, for example, in Hans Rickert had conceived intentionality as a characteristic of only the lived experiences that are directed toward real things. The Neo-Kantian conception implies that there are lived experiences such as those of fantasy, memory, or even of mathematics that are non-intentional. Instead, for Husserl, intentionality is no longer dependent on reality; for Husserl and for phenomenology in general, every lived experience is a directedness-toward. The psychic field consists in a correlation between noesis thought and noema the object thought about , the intentio and the intentum.